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Abstract
Public pension funds that cover retirement benefits for almost 20 million active
or retired employees have been significantly underfunded. An important,
though largely overlooked, issue related to pension underfunding is the
excessive investment risk levels assumed by public plans. Our analysis
suggests government accounting standards strongly affect public fund
investment risk, as higher return assumptions (used to discount pension
liabilities) are associated with higher investment risk. Public funds undertake
more risk if they are underfunded and have lower investment returns in
previous years, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Furthermore,
pension funds in states facing fiscal constraints allocate more assets to equity
and have higher betas. There also appears to be a herding effect in that a
change in CalPERS portfolio beta or equity allocation is mimicked by other
pension funds. Solutions to excessive investment risk include use of more
realistic discount rates such as a Treasury rate or a municipal bond yield to
estimate liabilities and regulations or practices that reduce the ability of a plan
to shift an underfunding burden to future generations.
Keywords: Public pension funds; Investment risk; State fiscal constraints;
Risk transfer; Government accounting; Public union

PENSION CRISIS ISSUE: UNDERFUNDING AND EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING
State public pension plans, mostly defined benefit (DB) plans, cover pension benefits for
12.8 million active public employees and 5.9 million retirees and other annuitants. 1 However, by
various funding measures, public pension plans have been significantly underfunded, particularly
amid the recent financial crisis. By the end of fiscal year 2009, public pension plans had
accumulated a total funding deficit of $697 billion (measured by the difference between actuarial
pension assets and liabilities), with an average actuarial funding ratio of 0.75. For most plans, the
actuarial rate, the rate for discounting promised payments to retirees, is 8 percent. However, if
future liabilities for these plans are discounted at lower rates to reflect the near certainty of
payment, such as treasury or municipal bond rates (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2011), the funding
ratio decreases to 0.43 or 0.59, respectively,
An important though largely overlooked issue related to pension underfunding is the
(excessive) investment risk levels assumed by public pension plans. Plans allocating a higher
percentage of funds to the stock market are more prone to market fluctuations. From 2001 to
2009, on average more than 56 percent of the pension assets were invested in the stock market.
The average 2009 pension asset beta of 0.63, suggests that given another market drop of 35
percent, which was the drop experienced during the 2008 financial crisis, public plans would lose
22 percent of their total fund value. 2 Furthermore, underfunding and risk-taking behavior of
public pension plans have become more imperative in light of state budget crises. This is because
state governments are forced to use a greater portion of the budget for making pension
contributions while reducing the expenditures on other programs and social welfare.
1

The severe funding gap prompts the question of whether the state governments will adopt
riskier investment positions in the hope of raising returns and lowering the shortfall. Using data
from several resources, we investigate the determinants of pension risk-taking policy during the
period 2001 through 2009 after taking into consideration state government incentives, political
pressure, fiscal constraints, labor union presence, and workforce features. Our measures of
investment risk include the percentage of total plan assets invested in the equity markets and the
pension asset beta (Jin, Merton, and Bodie 2006). In general, higher allocations to equity and
higher asset betas indicate a riskier portfolio, one more sensitive to market fluctuations.

HYPOTHESES, DATA, VARIABLES, AND MODEL
Hypotheses
A priori, the effect of underfunding on pension risk-taking policy may be explained by
competing hypotheses: risk management versus risk transfer. One incentive both private and
public DB funds may have in common is risk management. An unexpected required funding
increase for pension contributions may reduce the state government ability to invest in capital
expenditures because, in the short run, the state/municipal budget is fixed. The implications are
that, from a risk management perspective, states would prefer to have predictable pension
contributions. Accordingly, asset allocation decisions would be a function of funding status—
safe, well-funded plans could invest in more risky securities while underfunded plans invest in
less risky assets. Alternatively, there is a moral hazard, or risk transfer incentive, to consider, in
that taxpayers are ultimately responsible for underfunded public pension plans, and governments
may raise taxes to fund plans (Gold 2003). Early research on funding levels, such as Epple and
Schipper (1981) or Inman (1981, 1982) suggests that underfunding is a method of passing
2

current pension costs to future taxpayers. However, politicians’ time frames are organized
around election cycles and may not focus on long-term funding issues (Giertz and Papke 2007).
The risk transfer hypothesis predicts that severely underfunded pension funds would take on
more risk.
Other factors may also affect risk-taking investment behavior. Public pension plans have
a unique set of issues to consider: politics, fiscal constraints, and public pension accounting.
Politics may play a role in that political influence could pressure the fund to buy bonds issued by
the state or local government or to direct funds to economically targeted investments. And if
these investments provide inefficient returns, then remaining assets may be invested in riskier
securities. Furthermore, if states face fiscal limitations that restrict borrowing, pension fund debt
may act as a substitute (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009). Fiscal constraints also cause states to
manipulate actuarial assumptions to lower required contributions (Eaton and Nofsinger 2004).
Finally, public pension plans are regulated by GASB 25, which allows pension liabilities to be
discounted at the assumed rate of return, which is most commonly 8 percent. Higher assumed
returns reduce the discounted liabilities, which in turn reduces the required contributions.
Accordingly, we add additional hypotheses of political influence, fiscal constraint, and
accounting effect.
Finally, there are some factors, such as union membership, demographic make-up of
employees, and investment herding behavior that could affect both public and private pension
plans. If union membership is associated with better benefits—which in turn creates higher
pension obligations—then to cover the increased benefit expense, the investment policy, in terms
of equity allocation, could shift. From a demographic perspective, age and gender of DB plan
participants may affect the risk-taking behavior of the fund. For example, traditional portfolio
3

theory expects risk-taking tolerance to decline with age. In addition, mimicking other investment
behavior is common among institutional investors. According to Park (2009), managers of
pension funds tend to follow peer group norms such that asset allocation to all equity hovers
around 64–75 percent. Pension fund managers, like other fund managers, have career concerns
and tend not to deviate from peer group investments by holding nonconventional portfolios.
Alternatively, public pension plan managers may follow the best performers or plans considered
to be large and influential, such as CalPERS. These hypotheses would be union effect,
demographic effect, and herding effect.
Data
The major data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from the Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College (2011). The data are available from fiscal year 2001 to
2009, with a total of 1,134 pension system-year observations, covering 126 pension systems for
50 states and the District of Columbia. We obtain the historical data on the state general
obligation bond ratings and net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income from
Moody’s Investors Service. The public employee union membership and coverage data are
obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. The economically targeted
investment (ETI) information is obtained from the Pension Funds and Urban Revitalization
Center, University of Oxford. 3
Key variable definition
We measure pension risk as either the percentage of total plan assets invested in the
equity market or pension asset beta (Jin, Merton, and Bodie 2006), which is the weighted
average beta of all asset classes in a pension plan’s total assets. The pension funding ratio is
4

defined as pension assets’ value over pension liabilities. The actuarial funding ratio uses actuarial
values for both assets and liabilities, reported in the PPD. The economic funding ratio uses the
market value of pension assets and a more realistic discount rate to determine the present value
of total future liability payments. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) advocate the use of either
Treasury rate or municipal bond yield as the appropriate discount factors in estimating public
pension liabilities. We obtain the economic pension liabilities for 50 states (excluding D.C.) from
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009, 2011). The measures are available only for fiscal year 2008 and
2009. 4
Model
We construct four multivariate regression models of public pension risk-taking behavior
that combine proxy variables for each hypothesis, where the dependent variable is equity
allocation percentage or pension asset beta. A potential issue with the model specification is that
equity allocation, the pension funding ratio, and the state rating could be jointly determined. If
true, then OLS regression provides biased estimators. In effect, there is a possible feedback
effect between equities allocation and underfunding; that is, the causal effect could extend in
both directions. Furthermore, the same logic applies to the state rating and pension underfunding.
As public pension plans are a contractual liability, lower pension funding could result in lower
credit ratings. To account for the endogeneity issue, we construct a simultaneous set of
regression equations for equity allocation, state ratings, and funding ratios and use a two-stage
procedure to estimate the coefficients. The statistical results from the regression analysis appear
in our full-length paper (Mohan and Zhang 2012). The implications from our research are
discussed below.
5

RESULTS
To summarize, using the percentage of total plan assets invested in the equity markets
and the pension asset beta as alternative measures of investment risk, we find that government
accounting standards strongly affect public fund investment risk. In addition, public funds
assume more risk if they are underfunded and have lower investment returns in the previous
years. Pension funds in states facing financial constraints also undertake more risk in their
pension fund investment.
Public accounting effect
We find government accounting standards to strongly affect public fund investment risk,
as higher return assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher
equity allocation and beta. In particular, a 100-basis-point increase in pension return assumption
is associated with about 1.72 percent to 4.51 percent increase in equity allocation. The
corresponding increase in pension asset beta given a same magnitude increase in the return
assumption is 0.04—0.06. This suggests that an important incentive of public pension funds
taking high investment risk is to justify the accounting choice. Therefore, determining the
appropriate discount rate to measure pension liabilities is an important option to reduce state
governments’ incentive to take excessive risks.
Risk transfer incentive
Private pension plans appear to take less investment risk when their pension funding
ratios are lower. Our results suggest that public funds assume more risk if they are underfunded
or have lower investment returns in the previous years, evidence consistent with risk transfer or
intent to pass underfunded pension obligations to future taxpayers. Again, this risk-taking
6

behavior is not necessarily in the plan participants’ best interest. Taxpayers might be ultimately
called upon to close the funding gap. Therefore, pension laws and policies should be in place to
restrict state governments’ ability to shift their pension risk to future generations.
State fiscal constraint effect
Using Moody’s state ratings for general obligation bonds and state net tax-supported debt
as a percentage of personal income to proxy for state fiscal constraints, we find that pension
funds in states facing financial constraints are more likely to take higher risk in their pension
fund investments. Accordingly, to mitigate the state fiscal constraint effect and reduce the
incentive to substitute pension underfunding for debt, an alternative option is to switch DB plans
to cash balance plans or defined contribution (DC) plans.
Other effects
Our results suggest a degree of “follow the leader,” in that plan managers tend to follow
the risk-investing behavior of large and high-profile plans (i.e., CalPERS). Furthermore, we
report a mild public union effect—that is, in order to provide larger retirement benefits for
unionized public employees, fund managers pursue a riskier investment allocation. Finally,
limited evidence is offered that economically targeted investment policies are associated with the
lower pension investment risk.

SUMMARY AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING PENSION CRISIS
Overall, our findings suggest that the risk levels of public pension funds are determined
by various factors, including state governments’ incentives to justify the accounting choice, to
shift pension risk to future taxpayers, and to substitute underfunded pension liabilities for
7

borrowing. A first step toward addressing the problem would be to appropriately discount future
liabilities. Under the government accounting standard (GASB 25), public pension plans currently
use the expected return on plan assets to discount pension liabilities, which is equal to 8 percent
for a majority of pension plans. In a sharp contrast, economists (such as Novy-Marx and Rauh
[2011]) suggest that the discount rate should appropriately reflect the risk level inherent with the
pension liabilities, and they advocate using either Treasury rate or municipal bond yield as
pension liabilities discount rate. 5 Note that as either rate is much lower than 8 percent, the use of
a Treasury rate or municipal bond yield would significantly increase pension liabilities, thus
dramatically reducing pension funding ratios.
Some private pension plan solutions could be adopted to address the public pension
crisis. An option to limit state government’s ability to shift the underfunding burden to future
generations is to require pension plans that are at risk or significantly underfunded to make extra
pension contributions. This suggestion borrows the insight from private pension plans—PBGC
classifies a pension plan as at risk if funding ratio is below 65 percent and has imposed strict
requirement on pension contributions and insurance premium for these severely underfunded
plans. A growing trend in the private sector is to freeze, terminate, or convert DB plans to cash
balance or DC plans. In fact, a growing number of states have departed from the traditional DB
pension plans. For example, Utah has required public employees to choose between a DC plan
and a hybrid plan—such as a 401(k) component—and employees not making an explicit choice
will be enrolled in the hybrid plan.
Finally, state governments could also use a credit market solution to pass pension risk
onto investors willing to or having the ability to assume more risks. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010)
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suggest pension security bonds as an option to address the state pension crisis. A key feature for
pension security bonds is federal tax subsidies, contingent on the state reducing its underfunding.
NOTES
1. The National Association of State Retirement Administration Web site (http://www.nasra.org).
2. Beta measures the sensitivity of financial asset returns to the overall stock market change (i.e., using S&P 500
index as a proxy). Pension asset beta captures the risk of a pension plan’s exposure to alternative investments,
including private equity, venture capital, hedge funds, and other alternative assets.
3. The data for ETI are available for fiscal years 2001 and 2003. In addition, we obtain the fiscal year 2008 ETI
information from a research report conducted by the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability of the State of Florida (2008).
4. The major tests are conducted using the actuarial funding ratio based on the full sample from 2001 to 2009. When
the economic pension funding ratio is used, the sample is from 2008 and 2009.
5. As a reference, private pension funds use the yield on high quality corporate bonds (i.e., A-rated corporate bonds)
as a discount rate, according to SFAS158 issued by FASB.
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